Yaters gonna yate1/5/2024 ![]() But I felt, in order to talk about JUST CAUSE, you've got to touch on NIMROD DANCER, because it was so important. I didn't know what you were going to say when you made your presentation at the Battle Analysis Conference yesterday, and I certainly didn't want to steal your thunder. It was really a model, I think, for those kinds of operations, and so we continued to look at that. It set the pattern that Kellogg stepped in on and followed suit. The next brigade down was Kellogg's, and then Burney 10 was on deck, but he never got there for the NIMROD DANCER. We watched Dave very carefully, and he set the trend, the pattern for the following brigade. LTG CAVEZZA: That was really well thought out, well presented. He just gave a super briefing of what NIMROD DANCER was all about and what his specific role was what was done and the challenges. LTG CAVEZZA: You remember GEN Vuono 9 had a meeting with his four-stars and they flew Hale back to brief the four-stars. LTG CAVEZZA: Are you talking about before, during, or after? To what extent was COL Hale's experience studied back here? Was that something that was translated back here in terms of OPD, or in any way studied? I know-well, I will just back off. The guidance from the national command authority is, "Don't start a war, but be aggressive." And as a result of his experience, he talked about an FTP. GEN Warner 8 is there, MG Loeffke is there. YATES: COL Hale's experience once he arrived. We, to the best of my knowledge, even at the staff level, had good a relationship. Communications were good, but so were the relations between the division and JTF PANAMA. I went down there whenever I felt it was necessary. ![]() Although those guys were OPCON to them, they reported directly back to me. Both Bernie Loeffke and Mark Cisneros 7 recognized that our chain still existed. LTG CAVEZZA: There were some differences which you detected, obviously, but it did not interfere with the chain of command. LTG CAVEZZA: When I was back at Ord,, still? One would be: How much latitude did you have with COL Hale and COL Kellogg, 5 since they were OPCON to JTF PANAMA? I know when you went down, you were able to keep the paint and the rag top 6 even though JTF PANAMA at that point had done away with it. There are a couple of questions about that I have left. YATES: I talked to you in January 1990, when you were briefly the JTF PANAMA commander, and I covered NIMROD DANCER at that point with you. I felt that if he had to shoot first, it would be justifiable.ĭR. I felt comfortable in saying that with a commander like Hale because he's a very mature commander and totally in control of the situation. If he as a commander felt that one of his soldiers was about to be endangered, he had my authority and my support to take whatever action was necessary to prevent that. LTG CAVEZZA: Force protection was his top priority is what I told him. You indicated that your guidance to COL Hale 3 (I don't know how you'd want to describe it, unofficial or whatever, since he was OPCON to JTF PANAMA 4) was that the security of the soldiers should come first. servicemen below that of the political consideration. YATES: The first thing I wanted to get on tape was what you mentioned yesterday, 1 when I was talking about Operation NIMROD DANCER, 2 how the guidance given and the rules drawn up put the security of the U.S. Wright, Jr., XVIII Airborne Corps (former XVIII Airborne Corps) Historian. The interview is with LTG Carmen Cavezza, Commander, I Corps formerly Commander, 7th Infantry Division (Light). WRIGHT: This is an Operation JUST CAUSE interview being conducted at Building 2025, Fort Lewis, Washington, on 30 April 1992. Wright, Jr., US Army Center of Military HistoryĭR. Larry Yates, US Army Combat Studies Instituteĭr. Interview Conducted 30 April 1992 at Building 2025, Fort Lewis, Washingtonĭr. JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH IN OPERATION JUST CAUSE
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